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Smart  time  of  use  tariffs  are  a  key  part  of  most  government’s  strategies  to ensure  our  future  electricity
supply  is clean,  affordable  and  secure  –  but will  consumers  be willing  to  switch  to them?  This paper
presents  the  results  of a  survey  experiment  conducted  on  a nationally  representative  sample  of  2020
British  energy  bill payers.  The  data  suggests  that  over  a third  of  bill payers  are  in  favour  of  switching
to  a 3-tiered  smart  time  of  use tariff,  indicating  a sizeable  potential  market  for these  tariffs.  There  is
substantial  variation  in  willingness  to switch,  driven  by differences  in loss-aversion  and  ownership  of
demand  ﬂexible  appliances  rather  than  standard  socio-economic/demographic  factors.  This  is the ﬁrst
time  loss-aversion  has  been  measured  amongst  energy  bill payers  and  the results  suggest  loss-aversionoss aversion
ehavioural economics
omestic
lectric vehicles
is likely  to stiﬂe  consumer  uptake;  93% of bill payers  are  loss-averse  (care  more  about  avoiding  ﬁnancial
losses  than  making  savings)  and  loss-averse  people  are  substantially  less  willing  to  switch  to  the time  of
use  tariff  (p < 0.001).  A randomised  control  trial  ﬁnds  that  loss-framed  messages  are  unlikely  to  overcome
loss-aversion  to  boost  uptake.  Marketing  campaigns  tailored  towards  electric  vehicle  owners,  who  were
signiﬁcantly  more  willing  to  switch,  could  increase  uptake  during  and  after  the  smart  meter  roll-out.
© 2016  The  Author(s).  Published  by  Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
example, by running their washing machines or tumble-dryers at
off-peak periods, when the electricity rate is cheaper. Dynamic time. Introduction and literature review
A major challenge for renewable energy consumption, energy
ecurity and energy affordability is how to encourage consumers
o switch from ﬂat-rate electricity tariffs to time of use tariffs which
harge consumers for their electricity according to the time of day
hey are using it [1–4]. This is because, in the transition away from
ossil fuels, governments need to ensure that people can access
he energy they need, at prices they can afford, when the sun is
ot shining and the wind is not blowing, particularly at times of
eak demand. One solution is to increase fossil-fuel supply capac-
ty for use at peak times [5], however this will be costly and could
ead to an increase in net carbon emissions. Alternative ways to
rovide this ﬂexibility include energy storage, interconnectors [6]
nd demand-side response (DSR), an additional but much less cited
olution.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: m.nicolson.11@ucl.ac.uk (M.  Nicolson), g.huebner@ucl.ac.uk
G. Huebner), d.shipworth@ucl.ac.uk (D. Shipworth).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.12.001
214-6296/© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articleDSR, sometimes referred to as DR (demand response), can
be deﬁned as “a change in electricity consumption patterns in
response to a signal” [7,p. 9].1 Three main types of signal are price
(e.g. static time of use tariffs and dynamic time of use tariffs), vol-
ume  (e.g. load capping) and direct control contracts (e.g. direct load
control in which a third party provider remotely switches appli-
ances on/off) [8,9]. Static time of use tariffs charge consumers two
or more ﬁxed prices for their electricity depending on the time of
day, day of week or season, with higher rates applied at peak peri-
ods, providing consumers with certainty about what price they will
pay and when [10]. Consumers can save money on these tariffs by
shifting their consumption away from times of peak demand, forof use tariffs offer consumers prices which could vary on an hourly
1 DSR is deﬁned in a number of slightly different ways however all of them assume
that it involves a change in the timing of electricity use in response to some sort of
signal [9,91,94]. This distinguishes DSR from another form of demand-side man-
agement called demand reduction, which aims to achieve an overall reduction in
energy consumption [2,67].
 under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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r sub-hourly basis [11] and are most effective when combined
ith additional equipment that reduces peak demand by automat-
cally turning off non-essential electrical devices [12,13]. However,
ntil these additional automation technologies are fully tested and
osted [4], it is expected that static time of use tariffs will be the
redominant mechanism by which consumers are incentivised to
ndertake DSR [14]. This paper therefore solely discusses static
ime of use tariffs because they are the simplest form of tariff that
an deliver peak-load reductions in electricity demand [12] with-
ut the need for any other technology than a smart meter. Although
tatic time of use tariffs can be implemented without smart meters
 in the UK, 13%–21% of energy bill payers are on ‘legacy’ time of
se tariffs introduced in the 1970s to stimulate night-time demand
or nuclear power – the provision of near real-time electricity con-
umption data from smart meters will enable suppliers to offer new
ypes of ‘smart’ time of use tariffs (hereafter referred to as sTOU tar-
ffs) which can charge consumers two or more rates for electricity
ithout having to install additional meters. Before smart meters,
hese ‘legacy’ time of use tariffs required the installation of special
eters that could record, for example, day-time and night-time
lectricity independently [15]. As such, the business cases for the
ajority of smart meter programmes around the world assume that
onsumers will participate in DSR through sTOU tariffs [16–19].
n the UK, for example, the Government’s business case for smart
eters relies on an additional 20% of consumers switching to a
TOU tariff by 2030, in addition to those who are already on ‘legacy’
ime of use tariffs [4].
However, to work, sTOU tariffs require two types of consumer
articipation: (1) consumers to switch to a sTOU tariff (switching)
nd; (2) respond to the price signals by changing their consumption
atterns (load shifting). Ample evidence suggests that, once on a
TOU tariff, consumers will shift their consumption away from peak
imes (see Ref. [12] for a literature review of 30 trials). However,
t is one thing to create a set of tariffs and technologies that aim
o change the timing of consumers’ electricity use – it is another
hing to design and market tariffs that the average consumer will
ctually switch to. The majority of consumers rarely switch their
nergy tariff or supplier, despite the large savings on offer [20]. In
he UK, for example, in the two decades since the privatisation of the
etail energy market, less than half of the British population have
eft their incumbent supplier [20] and, every year, more than half
f British consumers forego hundreds of pounds worth of savings
y not switching energy tariff [21]. Why  is this and how can we
revent it from threatening consumer participation in DSR?
According to classical economics, consumers expecting to max-
mise their utility from sTOU tariffs will switch to a sTOU tariff
nd any increase in tariff choice enabled by smart meters will
ncrease the number of sTOU tariff users by increasing the number
f people for whom these tariffs offer maximum utility. However,
he seeming failure of consumers to make decisions which max-
mise their net utility is well documented in all domains from
ealth to personal ﬁnances and, for a variety of reasons, is par-
icularly prevalent in the environmental sector [22]. For example,
he discrepancy between actual and optimum levels of householder
nvestment in energy efﬁciency is a well-documented phenomenon
hich has come to be known as the ‘energy efﬁciency gap’ [23–25]
ince Hirst and Brown coined the term in 1990 [23]. Economists
ave long recognised that market failures (including externalities,
mperfect competition and imperfect information) can lead to sub-
ptimal decision making [24], which they argue should be corrected
s directly as possible, for example, by providing information to
mperfectly informed consumers [25] or state interventions such as
igouvian taxes, mandates and bans [24]. For example, to achieve
ts targets, the Irish energy regulator is making sTOU tariffs manda-
ory following the smart meter roll out [26].Social Science 23 (2017) 82–96 83
However, it has not been until more recently that, following the
early seminal work of psychologists Kahneman and Tversky in 1979
[27–29] and Herbert Simon [30], some environmental economists
have proposed that people do not just fail to make optimal deci-
sions because of market failures but because they are not rational
decision-makers who evaluate costs and beneﬁts like economist do
[24,31–34]. The integration of psychology into a classical economic
framework has become known as behavioural economics [35], a
ﬁeld which has documented numerous ways in which real-world
consumer choices deviate systematically from those predicted by
classical economics.
One of the most serious violations of classical economics which
could stiﬂe uptake to sTOU tariffs is loss-aversion [36]. Loss-
aversion was  ﬁrst inferred from the observation that participants
in laboratory experiments will turn down coin-toss gambles of
the type in which they have a 50% chance of winning £110 or a
50% chance of losing £100–even though the expected outcome is
that they would be ﬁnancially better off from taking the gamble
[27]. Loss-aversion is one component of Prospect Theory [27,29,37]
which predicts that, rather than maximising their utility against
a ﬁxed budget constraint, people evaluate costs and beneﬁts in
relation to deviations from a reference point, which is commonly
taken to be the status quo [36]. Downward deviations from the
status-quo are perceived as losses and, according to studies on loss-
aversion, people care twice as much about avoiding losses than
gains [27,29,37], regardless of whether these losses are ﬁnancial
or otherwise [37–39]. In the energy tariff domain, for example,
qualitative research by British energy regulator Ofgem found that
energy bill payers tend to “focus too much on potential losses (e.g.
higher prices, problems during the switching process) than poten-
tial gains” when considering whether to switch energy tariff and
suggested this may  explain why people do not switch more often
[17,p. 3]. Loss-aversion could play an even bigger role in reducing
switching rates to sTOU tariffs because, although consumers could
save money by switching from a ﬂat-rate to a sTOU tariff and shift
their electricity use away from the peak times (gains), they could
also see a large increase in their bills (losses) if they are unable to
shift their electricity away from the expensive peak times. If con-
sumers care twice as much about avoiding ﬁnancial losses as they
do about making ﬁnancial gains, they will prefer to stay on their
current tariff, rather than face the prospect of paying more if they
switch to a sTOU tariff. Loss-aversion thus leads to another viola-
tion of classical economics called status-quo bias [42], deﬁned as a
preference for the current state of affairs [42]. Since the majority
of British consumers are on ﬂat-rate tariffs (80–90% [15]), status-
quo bias would favour ﬂat-rate over sTOU tariffs. Further, as noted,
loss-aversion does not just apply to money and switching from a
ﬂat-rate to a sTOU tariff also means losing ﬂexibility over when
household appliances can be run, which could reduce comfort and
convenience (losses), which studies of loss-aversion suggest will be
weighed twice as high as the potential gains (savings from off-peak
usage) [27,43].
However, although there are ample studies on loss-aversion
[44–49], there is still a lack of evidence on the extent to which
loss-aversion affects the average person and therefore disagree-
ment over the extent to which loss-aversion poses a threat to
people’s abilities to make optimal decisions [36]. This is because
loss-aversion has predominantly been measured in laboratory
experiments amongst psychology students [27] or inferred from
the real-world behaviour of the select group of individuals who par-
ticipate in the stock market [48–51], individuals who are likely to
have very different attitudes towards risk than the average person.
Although there have been some attempts to study loss-aversion in
the real world amongst more typical people (e.g. taxi drivers [52]),
these studies have not measured loss-aversion directly, making it
hard to rule out alternative explanations for the behaviour observed
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Morton et al. [65], or a report from the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, as in Spence and Pidgeon [66]. Further, telling
people about the environmental beneﬁts of sTOU tariffs may  not
2 For example, a crude search of Science Direct using the keyword ‘energy’
alongside keywords indicating energy demand reduction (‘conservation’, ‘saving’,
‘reduction’), yields over a million search hits whereas when the keyword ‘energy’
is  used alongside words indicating demand side response (‘demand response’, ‘load
shifting’, ‘peak load reduction’, ‘demand side response’), just over 6000 hits are
obtained when no exclusion criteria are applied such as date or language of publica-
tion. Although the total number of hits varies depending on different synonyms used,
the ratio of hits for energy demand reduction compared to demand side response is4 M. Nicolson et al. / Energy Resea
53]. For example, it has been pointed out that the willingness-
o-pay/willingness-to-accept gap could be better explained by a
ack of market experience [54] than loss-aversion. This uncertainty
ver how to apply loss-aversion in real life [36] is also evident in
ts application in the energy literature. For example, although a
umber of studies suggest that loss-aversion is likely to reduce con-
umer uptake of a range environmentally beneﬁcial goods such as
nergy efﬁcient appliances and green energy tariffs [33,55], none
f them have tested this hypothesis quantitatively and linked it
o the behaviour in question. In particular, although participants
n Ofgem’s research workshops have tended to focus more on the
osts than the beneﬁts of switching energy tariff [41,p. 3], it is not
nown whether the average energy bill payer is loss-averse, and,
f so, whether this loss-aversion is likely to have a statistically sig-
iﬁcant reduction on their willingness to switch to a sTOU tariff.
his is because loss aversion has never been measured amongst a
ationally representative sample of energy bill payers and linked
o their decision to switch energy tariff. This is problematic for two
easons.
Firstly, if loss-aversion only affects a minority of energy bill
ayers it would be unlikely to pose a substantial threat to uptake
o sTOU tariffs; on the other hand, if the majority of bill payers
re loss-averse, this could, as hypothesised by Ofgem [40], explain
hy so few people switch tariff as well as presenting a signiﬁcant
arrier to the uptake of sTOU tariffs. In other words, the mere exis-
ence of people who are loss-averse, whilst violating a fundamental
ssumption of classical economics, does not on its own  imply that
onsumer behaviour will be sufﬁciently adversely affected as to
equire intervention from government or from energy companies
o ensure sufﬁcient uptake of sTOU tariffs.
Secondly, unless loss-aversion is measured directly, and linked
o people’s tariff switching decisions, it is hard to validate the
nderlying model that is meant to explain people’s tariff choices
56]. This is important because, if energy bill payers do not behave
s classical economic models predict, then standard policies used
y energy regulators such as information provision and price com-
arisons will be less effective than those which account for the way
n which people actually make decisions about their energy tariff.
s pointed out in [33], “until researchers offer up a viable theoreti-
al alternative to [classical] economics, others will continue to rely
n rational choice as the benchmark to guide beneﬁt-cost analyses”
5). For example, the UK smart meter impact assessment implicitly
ssumes that consumers are rational decision-makers who will sign
p to a time off use tariff if they expect to save money by doing so
4]. However, if consumers weigh losses higher than gains, fewer
eople will switch to a sTOU tariff than predicted by most cost-
eneﬁt analyses and different consumer engagement strategies will
e required to encourage people to switch.
Energy tariff marketing is currently overwhelmingly charac-
erised by messages which encourage consumers to switch to save
oney. However, if energy bill payers are loss-averse, emphasising
he ﬁnancial losses from not switching could be more persuasive
han emphasising the savings if they do. For example, the loss-
ramed message “Three people die every day because there are not
nough organ donors” encouraged more people to sign up to the
rgan donor register than a gain-framed message, “You could save
r transform up to 9 lives by joining the organ donor register” [39].
oreover, unlike ﬂat-rate tariffs, sTOU tariffs have additional social
eneﬁts for the environment and energy security. According to clas-
ical economics, telling people about these social beneﬁts should
ake no difference to uptake. However, the persistence of coopera-
ion in Dictator Games and Public Goods Experiments and the large
eal-world donations made by individuals to public goods such as
he Red Cross [57], has led some economists to infer that human
eings are motivated not only by purely selﬁsh concerns but also
by a desire to ‘do the right thing’ or ‘make the moral choice”’ [58,p. Social Science 23 (2017) 82–96
3]. These studies argue that, when making decisions, people make
trade-offs between what they judge to be in their own self-interest
and the potential costs and beneﬁts that their decisions may have
on others in society [58]. If consumers have so-called pro-social
preferences, telling people about these additional environmental
and energy security beneﬁts should be more motivating than just
focusing on the ﬁnancial beneﬁts. If people have pro-social prefer-
ences and weigh losses higher than gains, telling people about the
social costs to the environment and energy security of not partic-
ipating in DSR should be even more motivating than telling them
about the additional social and environmental beneﬁts.
However, until we  test this using a randomised control trial, it
is completely unknown whether such a strategy would be more
effective, less effective or no better than the current marketing
methods used by energy companies to encourage customers to
switch tariffs. Whilst an abundance of research has tested methods
of motivating people to engage in pro-environmental behaviours
such as energy demand reduction, consumer participation in DSR
has received substantially less attention in the academic literature,2
especially amongst disciplines that study human behaviour such as
psychology and economics [59]. Three randomised control trials
tested the effect of framed marketing messages on the willing-
ness of consumers to switch to time-based electricity tariffs, and
all of these have been performed on student or other types of con-
venience samples, including 107 Dutch university students [60],
participants of online labour markets in the US [61] and a conve-
nience sample recruited via social media and email [62].3 However,
it is unlikely that a framed marketing message will have the same
effect on the average energy bill payer’s willingness to switch to
a sTOU tariff as on the willingness of a Dutch undergraduate stu-
dent or the average participant of MTurk (an online labour market
in which US citizens can undertake tasks in return for ﬁnancial
payment). Students are more likely to pay a ﬁxed rate for their
energy as part of their rent or to live in shared accommodation in
which bills are split between a number of adults, lowering poten-
tial individual ﬁnancial savings (or losses) from switching tariff.
On the other hand, an MTurk sample could overestimate the per-
suasiveness of an environmental/energy security frame because,
compared to a high quality online market research panel, MTurk
participants tend to be younger and more likely to afﬁliate with
the Democratic party [63], characteristics associated with greater
concern for climate change [64]. Consistent with this, the MTurk
survey noted above [61], found that emphasizing a peak-load shav-
ing programme’s monetary beneﬁts reduced MTurker participants’
willingness to enrol relative to when only the environmental ben-
eﬁts were mentioned.
Moreover, a framed marketing message is unlikely to have the
same effect when placed within the context of real-life energy tariff
marketing literature, as when presented to people in a series of
isolated sentences, such as excerpts from the Stern Report, as insimilar.
3 The exception is the US SGIG Consumer Behaviour Studies, which trialled the
effect of opt-out recruitment on enrolment rates to time of use tariffs amongst cen-
tral  air conditioning customers of several US utility companies. However opt-out
enrolment is ethically problematic [95,96].
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e equally motivating when the marketing literature includes the
rice of energy on the sTOU tariff [61], especially if peak-time rate
s much higher than the off-peak rate, as is likely to be the case for
ost commercial sTOU tariffs.
With the smart meter roll-out already underway in most coun-
ries, evidence is rapidly required as to what level of consumer
emand there is for these tariffs and, if demand is lower than
equired, what consumer engagement strategies will effectively
oost demand. Although previous evidence ﬁnds that those on a
TOU tariff do shift their consumption away from peaks [12], if
witching rates are too low, then sTOU tariffs will have no notice-
ble impact on peak electricity loads.
To be most useful, this evidence needs to test whether some
onsumer groups are more likely to want to switch than oth-
rs, particularly those with higher than average ﬂexible peak
ime consumption (e.g. those with wet goods with timers [wash-
ng machines, dishwashers, tumble dryers] and electric vehicles),
ecause these groups will deliver the greatest peak-load reduc-
ions from shifting the timing of their electricity consumption. The
lectriﬁcation of transport is expected to place one of the great-
st strains on the future electricity network [67] making electric
ehicle owners particularly important candidates for domestic DSR.
ield studies suggest that charging clusters of electric vehicles are
ikely to double the domestic electricity load [68], with most vehicle
wners electing to charge for convenience during weekday morn-
ngs and upon arriving back home from work during the existing
vening peak time [68,69], except when they are enrolled on sTOU
ariffs [68]. In one study, plug-in electric vehicle owners enrolled
n a static sTOU tariff reduced their daytime and evening peak
harging by 50%, compared to a control group [69]. Considering
hat electricity is historically three times the price of other fuels
70], ensuring electric vehicle owners are on favourable tariff struc-
ures will also ensure that energy bills remain affordable as more
eople adopt electric vehicles and charge them from home. This
tudy therefore seeks to build on the work of Spence et al. [71] and
ell et al. [8] by collecting data on ﬂexible electric appliance own-
rship in Great Britain, to test whether these groups do have an
bove average willingness to participate in time-based pricing, as
ssumed by most smart meter impact assessments [4]. The study
ill also collect demographic data on people who are likely to have
ore ﬂexible working patterns, such as those who are retired or
mployed part-time, and may  therefore be better able to modify
he timing of their appliance usage.
Moreover, policymakers must also ensure that vulnerable con-
umers are not excluded from the wider beneﬁts of smart meters,
uch as sTOU tariffs [4,72]. Only two other nationally representative
urveys have measured consumer demand for DSR programmes
8,71], and they found conﬂicting results about the willingness of
ow-income consumers to participate in DSR programmes.
. Aims
This paper seeks to answer ﬁve main questions: (1) To what
xtent are British energy bill payers loss-averse?; (2) Does loss-
version reduce willingness to switch to a sTOU electricity tariffs?;
3); If loss-aversion reduces willingness to switch, would it be
ossible to exploit consumer loss-aversion to increase consumer
illingness to switch to sTOU tariffs by using loss-framed rather
han gain-framed marketing messages?; (4) What is the overall
illingness to switch to sTOU tariffs amongst bill payers? and; (5)
oes willingness to switch vary across demographic groups, par-
icularly vulnerable groups and those with high consuming ﬂexible
lectrical appliances such as washing machines and electric vehi-
les?Social Science 23 (2017) 82–96 85
3. Method—an online ﬁeld experiment
To achieve the aims of the research, whilst generating results
that could be generalised to the average energy bill payer in Britain,
a survey experiment was conducted. Gerber and Green [73] rec-
ommend applying four criteria to evaluate the generalisability of
experimental results: (1) authenticity of treatments; (2) authentic-
ity of participants; (3) authenticity of setting and; (4) authenticity
of outcome measures. The experimental design is described before
addressing each of these criteria in turn.
3.1. Experimental design
A broadly nationally representative sample of British energy
bill payers (N = 2020) were recruited by a market research com-
pany to participate in an online survey in which they were
randomly assigned to one of four digital leaﬂets containing fac-
tually equivalent descriptions of a three-tiered sTOU tariff which
emphasised either: (1) the private ﬁnancial beneﬁts of switch-
ing (“ﬁnancial gain-frame”); (2) the private ﬁnancial costs of not
switching (ﬁnancial loss-frame); (3) the private ﬁnancial and envi-
ronmental/energy security beneﬁts of switching (“ﬁnancial and
environmental/energy security gain-frame”); or (4) the private
ﬁnancial and environmental/energy security costs of not switching
(“ﬁnancial and environmental/energy security loss-frame”). Ran-
domisation was carried out on a rolling basis by the market research
company’s survey software, using Microsoft Excel’s random num-
ber generator. Participants had a 1 in 4 probability of being assigned
to any of the four experimental groups. A 1:1 allocation ratio
was employed to achieve an equal number of participants across
groups on average. The market research company pays participants
a small sum of money for each survey they complete which they
can redeem for cash or vouchers. Participants are also entered in
quarterly prize draws to win larger cash prizes (either 1 × £100 or
25 × £10 Amazon vouchers).
3.2. Authenticity of treatments
The study adopted the sTOU tariff used in the CLNR trials
that was  designed by Northern Powergrid and British Gas to be
commercially viable in 2020 [74]. The leaﬂets were designed to
resemble the marketing content available on the websites of major
energy suppliers and are reproduced in full in Appendix A of the
Supplementary material. In line with real-world marketing litera-
ture, which often uses green to promote the ‘green’ credentials of
products, the environmental/energy security framed leaﬂets also
presented the tariffs ‘green’ credentials in green font.
Manipulation checks conducted following participant exposure
to the leaﬂets reveal that participants perceived the frame manip-
ulations exactly as intended, with only a few minor exceptions.
Although the leaﬂets which included the environmental/energy
security implications of DSR contained more information than
the ﬁnancial-only leaﬂets, the manipulation checks revealed no
statistically signiﬁcant differences in the self-reported ease of
understanding of the information across participants assigned
to the environmental/energy security framed leaﬂets and those
assigned to the private ﬁnancial framed leaﬂets. Participants in the
environmental/energy security groups were just as able to recall
factual information about the tariff in a series of true/false ques-
tions than participants in the control group. The results of these
checks are presented in Appendix B of the Supplementary material.
The ﬁnancial gain-framed leaﬂet serves as the control group
because this is the current status-quo method amongst energy sup-
pliers of advertising their tariffs.
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.3. Authenticity of outcome
Until sTOU tariffs become commercially available, it is not pos-
ible to use switching rates to a sTOU tariff as a national measure
f demand for a sTOU tariff. This study used willingness to switch
s a measure of demand. Willingness to switch to the sTOU tariff
as captured immediately after exposure the leaﬂets: participants
ere then asked to rate, on a 7-point end-point Likert scale, how
illing they would be to switch to the sTOU tariff if it were available
n the market today.
.4. Authenticity of participants and correcting for sample
election
As in the two previous studies on consumer acceptance of DSR
mongst broadly nationally representative populations [8,71], par-
icipants are panel members of a market research company’s online
mnibus, a pre-recruited group of individuals who have agreed
o take part in online market research and social surveys. Partici-
ants for this study were recruited by the market research company
rom its existing pool of panel members via email to be repre-
entative of the online adult population of Great Britain in terms
f ﬁve demographic variables – age, gender, region, social grade
nd employment status using quota sampling. The ﬂow of par-
icipants from the initial recruitment email, intervention via the
uestionnaire and ﬁltering on basis of completed and incomplete
uestionnaire status is shown in Fig. 1. Participant inclusion criteria
re: (1) aged 18 or over; (2) live in England, Wales or Scotland and;
3) solely or jointly ﬁnancially responsible for paying either the
ousehold gas or electricity bill (energy bill payers). Participants
eeting the ﬁrst and second eligibility criteria were recruited by
he market research company via email. The ﬁrst item in the ques-
ionnaire screened participants for the third eligibility criterion;
articipants self-identiﬁed as being solely, jointly or not ﬁnancially
esponsible for paying their household gas or electricity bills. Par-
icipants who identiﬁed as not being ﬁnancially responsible were
xcluded after the ﬁrst question. A total of 14 people dropped
ut after randomisation but before responding to the Likert scale.
owever, since this attrition rate was extremely low (0.07%) and
easonably balanced across groups, no bias will have been intro-
uced.
There are two key sources of sample selection owing to using a
ationally representative sample of online market research partici-
ants which are common to all national surveys [75]. The members
f the online market research panel differ from the average British
nergy bill payer in two main ways: (1) they belong to the 86% of the
ritish population with internet access [76]; (2) they have opted-in
o participate in online market research in return for a per-survey
ee. Sampling weights will therefore be used in all analyses to help
orrect for both sources of sample selection along the observed
ovariates from which the weights are constructed, namely age,
ender, region, social grade and employment status. Participants
ere recruited topic-blind to avoid self-selection of people who
re interested in energy and tariffs.
.5. Authenticity of setting
The online survey environment shares some similarities with
he setting to which the results will be generalised because, in a
rive to cut costs, communication from energy suppliers is increas-
ngly delivered online via email or websites, rather than by mail,
hone and is never face-to-face, as is the case in laboratory studies
n this topic (e.g. [60]). Although respondents are aware that they
re participating in research, they are not under the direct obser-
ation of a researcher, as they would be in classroom laboratory
ettings such as Kahneman and Tversky’s original experiments on Social Science 23 (2017) 82–96
loss-aversion [27,29,37] or laboratory [60] or focus groups studies
of consumer acceptance of DSR [77]. This will help to minimise eval-
uation driven effects such as social-desirability bias and Hawthorne
effects.
3.6. Questionnaire design and eliciting consumer loss-aversion
A 20-item closed-question multiple-choice questionnaire was
designed to: (1) screen participants on inclusion criteria; (2) expose
participants to the treatment leaﬂets and collect their willingness to
switch to the sTOU tariff presented and; (3) gather additional demo-
graphic and household-level data about participants, including a
measure of loss-aversion and whether the respondent is already
on a legacy time of use tariff. The full questionnaire is reproduced
in Appendix C of the Supplementary material.
Loss-aversion was elicited from participants using a standard
set of ﬁnancial decision-problems from the economics literature
which require participants to accept or reject gambles with posi-
tive expected outcomes involving hypothetical ﬁnancial losses and
gains. In each gamble, the winning price was ﬁxed at £6 and only
the losing price was  varied (between −£2 to −£7). These questions
are reproduced in full in Table 1.
Small ﬁnancial stakes are used because people are risk-neutral
in small stake gambles, which means the questions capture
loss-aversion rather than risk-aversion [39]. Classical economics
explains aversion to large-scale risk using the concept of risk-
aversion: we might reject making high-value bets because a pound
that helps us avoid poverty is more valuable than a pound that
helps us become very rich. However, classical economic theory also
implies that people are risk neutral when the stakes are small [43].
In other words, amongst various gambles giving the same expected
net positive return (here £6), people should always prefer to accept
the gamble, because the expected loss is so small; winning £6 will
not make us rich but losing £6 would not make us poor. People
should therefore accept gambles #1–#5 because they all have a
positive expected value. Rejecting any of these gambles indicates
loss-aversion [43,78] and the more of these gambles people reject,
the more loss-averse they can be inferred as being.
The questions used in this survey were adapted from those used
in Gachter et al. [78] to measure loss-aversion amongst a sample of
German car buyers. Unlike Kahneman and Tversky’s [27] original
questions, these questions require a very limited understanding of
probability (“heads you win, tails you lose”) as opposed to math-
ematical notation such as (4000, 0.50); (3000, 0.50), which were
delivered to university students and staff. These questions provide a
very accessible and parsimonious method of eliciting loss-aversion
amongst the average energy bill payer to reduce measurement
error from fatigue effects.
These questions were placed immediately after the questions
which screened people for the third inclusion criteria (identify-
ing whether participants were energy bill payers) to avoid biasing
our estimation of loss-aversion due to possible priming effects
from other questions in the survey, particularly exposure to the
loss-framed leaﬂets. A number of neutral ‘buffer’ questions were
included after the loss-aversion questions but before the subse-
quent exposure to the treatment leaﬂets and the measurement of
the outcome (willingness to switch), to minimise priming effects
from the loss-aversion questions on response to the tariffs.
3.7. Statistical model
The equations presented in this section were speciﬁed prior to
the authors receiving the data from the market research company
and were documented in a Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP) submitted to the
Experiments in Governance and Politics (EGAP) website on 27 June
2014 (registration number 20140627). By planning and disclosing
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Fig. 1. Flow of study participants.
Table 1
Measuring loss-aversion using simple experiments.
Gamble Yes I would take this gamble No I would not take this gamble
#1 If the coin turns up heads then you lose £2; if the coin turns up tails then you win £6 ◦ ◦
#2 If the coin turns up heads then you lose £3; if the coin turns up tails then you win £6 ◦ ◦
#3 If the coin turns up heads then you lose £4; if the coin turns up tails then you win £6 ◦ ◦
#4 If the coin turns up heads then you lose £5; if the coin turns up tails then you win £6 ◦ ◦
#5 If the coin turns up heads then you lose £6; if the coin turns up tails then you win £6 ◦ ◦
#6 If the coin turns up heads then you lose £7; if the coin turns up tails then you win £6 ◦ ◦
N . [78] 
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to see the ﬁnancial loss-framed leaﬂet, the ﬁnancial and environ-
mental/energy security gain-framed leaﬂet or the ﬁnancial and
environmental/energy security loss-framed leaﬂet rather than the
4 The original speciﬁcation included a control variable for whether the individualote: these ﬁnancial decision-making questions are reproduced from Gachter et al
uros  for use on British participants.
he hypotheses to be tested and speciﬁcations to be used in advance
f seeing the data, the PAP should “avoid (or at least minimize)
ssues of data mining and speciﬁcation searching” [79,p. 3].
The following equation, including baseline covariates, will be
sed to test the impact of message-framing on the stated willing-
ess of British electricity bill-payers to switch to the sTOU tariff
mployed in this trial:
switchi = c + ˇ1T1i + ˇ2T2i + ˇ3T3i + 1 no qualifications
i + 2 gcsesi + 3 under gradi + 4 higher qualificationsi + 5 education no responsei + 6 femalei + 7 private renter
i + 8 social renteri + 9 other renteri + 10 loss aversei + εi
(1)with the exception that the amounts were changed to Pounds Sterling rather than
In Eq. (1),4 switchi represents the outcome variable which is a
measure of the respondent’s stated willingness to switch to the
sTOU tariff on a 7-point end-point Likert scale. The treatment dum-
mies, T1, T2 and T3, indicate whether individual i was assignedwas  responsible for making decisions about the household’s energy tariff; consistent
with the pre-analysis plan, this variable was  excluded because it had less than 95%
variation. The original speciﬁcation also intended to control for loss-aversion on a
continuous scale – however, having observed the data, it was clear that loss-aversion
is  not linearly correlation with willingness to switch.
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a 7-point Likert scale (here coded from 0 to 6) where 0 = Not at all
likely to switch and 6 = Very likely to switch. The bars represent the
percentage of participants who selected each point on the scale.
5 There is no gold standard way of coding loss aversion [97] so we took a data
driven approach. To account for non-linearity in preferences, loss-aversion was
coded according to whether a participant rejected any of the net positive gambles.
However, the results are substantively identical, regardless of how loss-aversion is
coded. In Gachter et al. [78], loss-aversion was  coded according to which gambles
participants rejected e.g. participants who rejected no gambles, gamble (1), gambles
(1–2), (1–3), (1–4) etc. However, this assumes that people have linear (or transitive)
preferences – that they would not reject gambles 1, 2, 3 which involve losses of £4
or  less and accept gamble 4, a higher value gamble involving potential losses of £5.8 M. Nicolson et al. / Energy Resea
ontrol group leaﬂet, which is the ﬁnancial gain-framed leaﬂet
espectively.
The coefﬁcients of interest, ˇ1, ˇ2 and ˇ3, represent the aver-
ge treatment effect of being exposed to the ﬁnancial loss-framed
eaﬂet, ﬁnancial and environmental/energy security gain-framed
eaﬂet or the ﬁnancial and environmental/energy security loss-
ramed leaﬂet respectively on an individual’s stated willingness to
ign up to the sTOU tariff as compared to the control group leaﬂet
gain-framed private interests). The error term, εi, captures the
nexplained variation in respondents’ willingness to switch to a
TOU tariff.
Covariates were included in Eq. (1) to increase the statistical
ower of the study and were selected on the basis of theoretical
nd empirical evidence [80] that they were correlated with the out-
ome variable but, because they were measured prior to participant
xposure to the leaﬂets, are uncorrelated with treatment status.
elected covariates include: an ordinal measure of the respondent’s
ighest educational qualiﬁcation (no education, GCSEs or equiv-
lent, A-level or equivalent, undergraduate degree or equivalent,
ostgraduate degree of equivalent, education not declared – the
eference category is having achieved A-levels as highest qualiﬁca-
ion); tenure (homeowner, private renter, social renter, other renter
 homeowner is the reference variable); gender (male, female) and;
 dummy  variable indicating whether the individual is loss-averse.
lthough other variables were measured prior to participant expo-
ure to the leaﬂets (employment status and age), the review of
he literature suggested that the combination of variables chosen
ould have the most explanatory power for the outcome, with-
ut needing to include employment status and age as additional
ovariates [15,77,81].
.8. Hypotheses and multiple comparisons
The model seeks to test four hypotheses therefore all results
eport statistical signiﬁcance levels adjusted according to the Ben-
amini and Hochberg method [82].
ypothesis 1. Loss-aversion will be correlated with a reduced
illingness to switch to the sTOU tariff. A negative coefﬁcient is
xpected on the dummy  variable indicating loss-aversion.
ypothesis 2. The ﬁnancial loss-framed leaﬂet will be more per-
uasive than the control leaﬂet (ﬁnancial gain-frame). A positive
oefﬁcient is expected on the dummy  variable indicating that the
articipant was in the ﬁnancial loss-framed group when the ﬁnan-
ial gain-framed group is the reference category.
ypothesis 3. The ﬁnancial and environmental/energy security
ain-framed leaﬂet will be more persuasive than the control leaﬂet
ﬁnancial gain-frame). A positive coefﬁcient is expected on the
ummy  variable indicating that the participant was in the ﬁnan-
ial and environmental/energy security gain-framed group when
he ﬁnancial gain-framed group is the reference category.
ypothesis 4. Loss-aversion and pro-social preferences imply
hat a message which emphasises the ﬁnancial and social costs to
he environment and energy security of not switching to a sTOU
ariff should encourage more people to sign up to a sTOU tariff
han any other message. A positive coefﬁcient is expected on the
ummy  variable indicating that the participant was in the ﬁnan-
ial and environmental/energy security loss-framed group when
he ﬁnancial gain-framed group is the reference category and for
his coefﬁcient to be the coefﬁcient with the highest magnitude..9. Statistical power
Following the recommended power standards [83], the study
as designed to have 80% power to detect treatment effects of 10% Social Science 23 (2017) 82–96
or more in either direction with 95% conﬁdence. Smaller percentage
increases in switching rates than 10% would only be commercially
meaningful if baseline switching rates are already relatively high,
which is unlikely to be the case, given that so few people switch
tariff each year.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
In line with national population statistics, the average proﬁle of
participants in the survey are homeowners in their late forties, in
full-time employment living in England in a two-person household
with gas central heating. Participant characteristics are discussed
in terms of the weighted estimates rather than the in-sample esti-
mates because the two are substantively identical. Table 2 reports
statistics on a selection of these sample characteristics.
Randomisation checks reveal that these characteristics are
equally distributed across groups. Of 63 hypothesis tests, three
variables are unbalanced across groups at the 95% conﬁdence level
which is fewer than would be expected by chance, indicating the
success of randomisation. For brevity, these results are not reported
here but are presented in Appendix D of the Supplementary mate-
rial.
4.2. Are British consumers loss-averse?
In line with Hypothesis 1, the overwhelming majority of British
energy bill payers displayed loss-aversion in their response to the
50/50 gamble questions.5 Exactly 5% of participants accepted all
the gambles indicating that they were willing to lose £7, the max-
imum that could be lost in the decision-making scenarios and 2%
accepted all the net positive gambles (#1–#5), but rejected gamble
#6, consistent with classical economics. These two small groups of
consumers, (just 7% of energy bill payers) are not loss-averse. The
remaining 93% rejected at least one of the net positive gambles,
indicating loss-aversion. Amongst this loss-averse group, people
displayed varying levels of loss-aversion. At the most extreme end
of the loss-aversion spectrum, 28% of participants rejected all gam-
bles implying that they were only willing to lose an amount smaller
than the value of £2. This means that nearly one third of British
energy bill payers are extremely loss-averse.
4.3. What is overall stated willingness to switch to a smart time
of use tariff?
Fig. 2 presents a horizontal bar graph of the main outcome vari-
able, stated willingness to switch to the sTOU tariff as expressed onThe transitivity assumption is another major assumption of classical economics but,
consistent with empirical literature that suggests that preferences are sometimes
non-linear [98], analysis of this data revealed that a small proportion (8%) of par-
ticipants in this sample rejected some of the lower value gambles whilst accepting
some higher value ones.
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Table  2
Characteristics of all trial participants.
Characteristics Mean Standard error
Respondent demographics and socio-economic status
Female (dummy) 51% 13%
Age  47.9 0.45
Employment status:
Employed full-time (dummy) 44% 1%
Employed part-time (dummy) 16% 1%
Unemployed (dummy) 5% 0.3%
Retired (dummy) 26% 1%
Student (dummy) 6% 1%
Not  reported (dummy) 4% 1%
Highest educational qualiﬁcation:
No qualiﬁcations (dummy) 9% 1%
GCSEs/O-levels/school leavers certiﬁcate (dummy) 29% 1%
AS/A  levels or equivalent (dummy) 23% 1%
Undergraduate degree (dummy) 25% 1%
Higher degree (dummy) 12% 1%
Education not reported (dummy) 2% 0.4%
Household characteristics
Tenure:
Homeowner (dummy) 63% 1%
Private renter (dummy) 17% 1%
Social renter (dummy) 18% 1%
Other (dummy) 2% 0.4%
Household energy
Main method of heating home:
Gas central heating (dummy) 77% 1%
Electric night storage (dummy) 8% 1%
Other (dummy) 15% 1%
Currently on a legacy time of use tariff:
Yes (dummy) 20% 1%
No  (dummy) 70% 1%
Don’t know (dummy) 9% 1%
17% 9% 10 % 25 % 21 % 10 % 8%
0 Not at all  li kely to swi tch
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The bar graph reveals that there is considerable variation
mongst British energy bill payers in terms of their stated will-
ngness to switch to the sTOU tariff. The standard deviation is
ore than half the size of the mean willingness to switch (M = 2.8,
D = 1.8). The median response on the Likert scale is 3 and the dis-
ribution is skewed slightly to the right (Skewness = −0.14), with
hree percent more of the sample selecting responses above the
id-point value on the Likert scale than below it.
In total, 39% of participants selected responses above the mid-
oint on the Likert scale and 36% of participants placed themselves
elow the mid-point. Therefore, when analysing the distribution
ith reference to the mid-point on the Likert scale, these results
uggest that over a third (39%) of British consumers are, to varying
egrees, in favour of switching to a next-generation sTOU tariff and
 similar proportion (36%) are not in favour of switching. A quarter
f participants (25%) placed themselves on the mid-point of the
cale which could be interpreted as meaning that they are unsure
bout what they think of the tariff or that they do not have a strong
pinion either way.
When just looking at the extreme ends of the distribution, eight
ercent of British bill payers rated themselves as being ‘Very likely
o switch’ (the highest point on the Likert scale) and twice as many
17%) rated themselves as ‘0 Not at all likely to switch’ (Fig. 2).6 Highly likely to switch
 sTOU tariff as expressed on 7 point Likert scale.
4.4. Do loss-framed marketing messages increase average stated
willingness to switch to a smart time of use tariff?
Contrary to Hypothesis 2, there is no statistically signiﬁcant dif-
ference in mean stated willingness to switch to the sTOU tariff
across those exposed to the ﬁnancial loss-framed leaﬂet rather than
the ﬁnancial gain-framed leaﬂet (Table 3, column 1). Contrary to
Hypothesis 3, there is no statistically signiﬁcant difference in mean
willingness to switch between participants exposed to the ﬁnancial
gain-framed leaﬂet and those exposed to the gain-framed ﬁnan-
cial and environmental/energy security framed leaﬂet. There is no
statistically signiﬁcant difference in willingness to switch across
those exposed to the loss-framed environmental/energy security
leaﬂet compared to the ﬁnancial gain-framed leaﬂet, in contrast
to Hypothesis 4 (Table 3, column 1). Although the coefﬁcients on
the 11 covariates cannot be interpreted causally, they are reported
for completeness. The statistical signiﬁcance and magnitude of the
coefﬁcients are almost identical in an Ordered Logit robustness
check (Table 3, column 2) and in three further speciﬁcations which
redeﬁne the control group leaﬂet – nor is there any evidence that
the effect of loss-framing is mediated by consumer loss-aversion in
a model which interacts a dummy variable for the six loss-aversion
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Table 3
Average treatment effects of message framing on stated willingness to switch to sTOU tariff.
Independent variables Dependent variable = Stated willingness to switch
to the sTOU tariff
(standard error)
[p-value]
Ordinary Least
Squares
(1)
Ordered Logit
Robustness Check
(2)
Treatment Dummies:
Financial loss-framed leaﬂet −0.14 (0.147)
[0.324]
−0.145 (0.150)
[0.333]
Financial and environmental/energy security gain-framed leaﬂet 0.032 (0.142)
[0.819]
0.018 (0.142)
[0.894]
Financial and environmental/energy security loss-framed leaﬂet 0.024 (0.139)
[0.862]
0.036 (0.140)
[0.800]
Covariates:
Highest  educational qualiﬁcation:
No qualiﬁcations (dummy) −0.130 (0.235)
[0.579]
−0.134 (0.243)
[0.582]
GCSEs/O-levels/school leavers certiﬁcate (dummy) 0.272 (0.140)
[0.053]
0.258 (0.139)
[0.063]
AS/A  levels or equivalent (dummy) Reference category Reference category
Undergraduate degree (dummy) 0.166 (0.142)
[0.243]
0.155 (0.141)
[0.274]
Higher  degree (dummy) 0.401 (0.160)
[0.012]*
0.410 (0.162)
[0.011]*
Education not reported (dummy) −0.154 (0.376)
[0.682]
−0.162 (0.358)
[0.651]
Female (dummy) −0.092 (0.098)
[0.348]
−0.110 (0.099)
[0.270]
Tenure:
Homeowner (dummy) Reference category Reference category
Private renter (dummy) 0.029 (0.134)
[0.827]
0.017 (0.132)
[0.895]
Social  renter (dummy) 0.014 (0.148)
[0.924]
−0.003 (0.150)
[0.987]
Other (dummy) −0.049 (0.400)
[0.902]
−0.0003 (0.371)
[0.999]
Loss-aversion (dummy) −0.976 (0.175)
[0.000]***
−0.979 (0.191)
[0.000]***
N 2020 2020
F  statistic 0.0000 0.0000
R  squared 0.03 –
Notes: Sampling weights applied. Classical standard errors are reported in brackets with p-values reported in square brackets. P-values relate to coefﬁcient’s t-score, testing
the  null hypothesis that the coefﬁcient value is equal to zero. For ease of interpretation, I do not report the coefﬁcients on the covariates which consist of the following
individual-level controls as speciﬁed in Eq. (1).
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t**Signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level (Benjamini and Hochberg [82] modiﬁed p-value is p >
Signiﬁcant at the 5% (Benjamini and Hochberg [82] modiﬁed p-value is p > 0.015).
*Signiﬁcant at the 1% level (Benjamini and Hochberg [82] modiﬁed p-value is p > 0.
ategories with a dummy  variable indicating assignment to either
f the loss-framed leaﬂets.6
.5. What predicts stated willingness to switch to a smart time of
se tariff?
Table 4 reports the results of an OLS linear regression of a series
f individual and household-level control variables on stated will-
ngness to switch to the sTOU tariff.7 The variables were chosen
ecause prior qualitative research suggests they are theoretically
ikely to be correlated with stated willingness to switch to a sTOU
ariff [15]. The model uses Region Fixed Effects to control for unob-
erved regional heterogeneity in stated willingness to switch to a
TOU tariff across each geographic region identiﬁed in the survey
6 Results available upon request.
7 The pre-analysis plan intended to control for switching habits using Ofgem’s
our-stage consumer typology however the ﬁnal model uses two  dummy variables
switched in 2013, switched in 2014) because it is more parsimonious and including
he Ofgem variables did not provide the model with greater explanatory power.26).
.
(North East, North West, Yorkshire and Humber, East Midlands,
West Midlands, East of England, London, South East, South West,
Wales and Scotland) to minimise the risk of omitted variable bias.
The only variable that is statistically signiﬁcantly negatively cor-
related with stated willingness to switch to a sTOU tariff at the
99.9% level is loss-aversion, the empirically documented observa-
tion that consumers will reject prospects with positive expected
utility if they involve losses. The magnitude of this effect is evident
even in the raw data.
Fig. 3 is a bar chart showing the average stated willingness to
switch to the sTOU tariff on the 7-point Likert scale according to
whether the bill payer is loss-averse. As the graph shows, loss-
averse people are substantially less willing to switch to the sTOU
tariff and the regression results conﬁrm that this difference is statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the highest level (Table 4). The results estimate
that loss-averse bill payers, which encompasses 93% of bill payers,
rate themselves more than half a point lower on the Likert scale
measuring stated willingness to switch as compared to a respon-
dent who  is not loss-averse.
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Table  4
Modelling stated willingness to switch to the sTOU tariff.
Stated willingness
to switch to the
sTOU tariff
(standard error)
[p-value]
Socio-demographic controls
Highest education qualiﬁcation (in categories):
No qualiﬁcations (dummy) −0.12 (0.239)
[0.610]
GCSEs/O-levels/school leavers certiﬁcate
(dummy)
0.22 (0.133)
[0.052]†
AS/A levels or equivalent (dummy) Reference group
Undergraduate degree (dummy) 0.12 (0.137)
[0.430]
Higher degree (dummy) 0.30 (0.157)
[0.052]†
Education not reported (dummy) −0.49 (0.363)
[0.176]
Female (dummy) −0.04 (0.099)
[0.709]
Age:
18-24 −0.15 (0.296)
[0.610]
25-44 0.10 (0.130)
[0.449]
45-64 Reference group
65-74 0.40 (0.193)
[0.042]*
75+ 0.65 (0.314)
[0.038]*
Tenure:
Homeowner (dummy) Reference group
Private renter (dummy) 0.14 (0.139)
[0.327]
Social renter (dummy) −0.07 (0.158)
[0.671]
Other (dummy) 0.25 (0.424)
[0.547]
Employment status:
Employed full-time (dummy) Reference group
Employed part-time (dummy) 0.13 (0.118)
[0.271]
Unemployed (dummy) 0.01 (0.150)
[0.960]
Retired (dummy) 0.03 (0.193)
[0.873]
Student (dummy) 0.21 (0.375)
[0.569]
Not  reported (dummy) 0.44 (0.541)
[0.420]
Household lifestyle:
Household regularly empty on weekdays but
regularly occupied on weekday evenings and
mornings (dummy)
0.35 (0.144)
[0.015]*
Household regularly occupied on weekdays and
weekends (dummy)
0.02 (0.116)
[0.879]
Main method of heating home:
Gas central heating (dummy) −0.10 (0.187)
[0.615]
Electric night storage (dummy) Reference group
Other (dummy) −0.14 (0.211)
[0.519]
Has  washing machine with timer (dummy) 0.09 (0.108)
[0.378]
Has  tumble dryer with timer (dummy) 0.27 (0.157)
[0.083]†
Has dishwasher with timer (dummy) 0.14 (0.140)
[0.322]
Owns electric or hybrid vehicle (dummy) 0.49 (0.237)
[0.039]*
Number of household occupants 0.10 (0.045)
[0.025]*
Has children aged <15 living at home (dummy) −0.05 (0.149)
[0.740]
Switched supplier in 2013 (dummy) 0.06 (0.116)
[0.631]
Table 4 (Continued)
Stated willingness
to switch to the
sTOU tariff
(standard error)
[p-value]
Switched supplier in 2014 (dummy) −0.17 (0.144)
[0.248]
Is  a prepayment meter customer (dummy) 0.40 (0.156)
[0.011]*
Is currently on a legacy time of use tariff (dummy) 0.52 (0.122)
[0.000]***
Loss-aversion (dummy) −0.61 (0.174)
[0.000]***
N 2020
F  statistic 0.0000
R  squared 0.10
Notes: Sampling weights applied. Classical standard errors are reported in brackets
with p-values reported in square brackets. P-values relate to coefﬁcient’s t-score,
testing the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcient value is equal to zero. The speciﬁca-
tion includes regional Fixed Effects which consist of a series of dummy variables for
each geographic region identiﬁed in the survey [North East, North West, Yorkshire
and  Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, London, South East,
South West, Wales and Scotland]. However, for brevity, the coefﬁcients on these
variables are not reported.
***Signiﬁcant at the 0.1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
†Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
The second largest coefﬁcient, is on the time of use tariff dummy.
Participants who  are already time of use tariff customers (those
on legacy time of use tariffs such as Economy 7, introduced in the
1970s and which require the installation of a special, but not smart,
meter) placed themselves half a point higher on the 7-point Likert
scale measuring stated willingness to switch to the sTOU tariff in
this trial. This result is statistically signiﬁcant at the 99.9% level and
is robust to the inclusion of controls for regional heterogeneity in
stated willingness to switch to a sTOU tariff.
The third largest coefﬁcient, is the coefﬁcient on the dummy
variable indicating the consumer owns an electric or hybrid vehicle,
after controlling for all other variables, indicating we can be over
95% conﬁdent that British energy bill payers who  own an electric
or hybrid vehicle are more willing to switch to a sTOU tariff than
owners of traditional internal combustion engine vehicles (e.g. that
run on petrol or diesel) regardless of which region in the country
they live. Although not statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% level, the
results indicates that we can still be over 90% conﬁdent that owners
of tumble dryers with timers are more willing to switch to a 3-tiered
sTOU tariff than bill payers who do not.8
In descending order of the magnitude of the coefﬁcient, the
following variables are statistically signiﬁcantly positively corre-
lated with stated willingness to switch at the 95% level: being
over 75 years old as compared to being aged between 45 and 64;
being aged 65–74 as compared to being aged 45–64; living in a
household that is regularly unoccupied on weekdays but regu-
larly occupied on weekday evenings and mornings, when the price
of electricity on the sTOU tariff is at its most expensive; being a
8 Although it is conventional to treat p-values which fall below the threshold of
p  = 0.05 as statistically signiﬁcant and those which exceed p = 0.05 as not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, the p-value is a continuous variable which, if interpreted as such,
can  provide a more informative or nuanced account of the likelihood that any given
result is true. This is because, “In the same way that a small P value does not guar-
antee that there is a real effect, a P value just above 0.05 does not mean no effect.”
[99,p. 1], particularly if the independent variable of interest has a low prevalence in
the population or has a small effect on the dependent variable of interest given the
sample size. Indeed, there are not many people in the UK  with tumble dryers with
timers. We therefore interpret results in terms of the conventional signiﬁcance level
of  p < 0.05 but also a slightly less stringent threshold of p < 0.10.
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fig. 3. Stated willingness to switch is negatively correlated with loss-aversion.
ote: The bars represent the mean stated willingness to switch to the sTOU tariff
cross non-loss averse and loss-averse energy bill payers.
re-payment electricity customer and; marginal increases in the
umber of household occupants.
Only two further demographic characteristics are statistically
igniﬁcantly correlated with stated willingness to switch at the
0% level: having been educated up to higher education level as
ompared to having been educated up to A-level and having been
ducated up to GCSE level or equivalent as compared to having
een educated up to A-level.
No other covariates are statistically signiﬁcantly correlated with
ntention to switch, at the 95% conﬁdence level or even a slightly
ess stringent conﬁdence level of 90%, including: employment sta-
us (including whether people were retired); tenure (whether
eople are private or social renters rather than homeowners);
hether people have children under the age of 15 living at home
nd; whether people had switched their energy tariff in either of
he previous two years.
. Discussion
This study sought to answer ﬁve main questions: (1) To what
xtent are British energy bill payers loss-averse?; (2) Is loss-
version associated with a reduced willingness to switch to sTOU
lectricity tariffs?; (3); If loss-aversion reduces willingness to
witch, would it be possible to exploit consumer loss-aversion to
ncrease consumer willingness to switch to sTOU tariffs by using
oss-framed rather than gain-framed marketing messages?; (4)
hat is the overall willingness to switch to sTOU tariffs amongst
ill payers? and; (5) Does willingness to switch vary across demo-
raphic groups, particularly vulnerable groups and consumers with
igh consuming ﬂexible electrical appliances such as washing
achines and electric cars? Six main conclusions can be drawn
rom the results.
.1. A third of British consumers are in favour of switching to a
mart time of use tariff
The study provides further evidence that there is a sizeable
otential market for sTOU tariffs amongst British consumers. In
otal, over one third (39%) of British energy bill payers surveyed said
hey were somewhat or strongly in favour of switching to a static
TOU tariff, consistent with the only other British survey on time
f use tariffs [8], suggesting that it is a robust measure of current
ritish consumer willingness to switch to these tariffs.
This does not mean that one third of consumers would switch,
f energy suppliers offered these tariffs to consumers today. Many
actors will affect the likelihood that a consumer with strong inten- Social Science 23 (2017) 82–96
tions to switch to a sTOU tariff will actually switch. However, there
is clearly a sizeable potential market of British people who  energy
suppliers could convert into sTOU tariff customers, after the smart
meter roll out. However, there are still many barriers to uptake
that will need to be addressed before these tariffs are adopted en
masse. One of the factors identiﬁed by this study is loss-aversion,
the empirically well documented phenomenon that people care
more about avoiding losses than they do about making gains.
5.2. Loss-aversion is likely to reduce willingness to switch to
smart time of use tariffs in Britain and may account for low rates
of tariff switching generally
Consistent with experimental ﬁndings from behavioural eco-
nomics, this study ﬁnds strong evidence that loss-aversion is likely
to present an important barrier to domestic consumer uptake of
sTOU tariffs. The overwhelmingly majority of British energy bill
payers are loss-averse (93%), and results from a Fixed Effects regres-
sion model estimate that we  can be over 99.9% conﬁdent that
loss-averse people are less willing to switch to a sTOU tariff. The
effect is equivalent to 0.3 standard deviation units, a large effect
considering how evidently difﬁcult it is to motivate consumers
to even consider switching their energy tariff [81] and given that
the size of the coefﬁcient indicates that loss-aversion is having the
largest singular impact on stated willingness to switch out of all 37
individual and household-level control variables in the analysis.
Although this study was  unable to determine what losses people
were most concerned about (ﬁnancial losses from being unable to
shift away from peak times, inconvenience at having to shift certain
household chores into different periods of the day, or some other
potential losses, e.g. to comfort if people feel they have to curb their
electricity use beyond a point which they deem to be comfortable),
the evidence on loss-aversion to date suggests that any of these
potential downsides to sTOU tariffs could play a role in reducing the
appeal of sTOU tariffs. Moreover, since loss-aversion has been found
to affect such an overwhelming proportion of energy bill payers,
loss-aversion is likely to present a substantive barrier to consumer
uptake to sTOU tariffs. In particular, the results suggest that fewer
people will switch to a sTOU tariff than predicted by most cost-
beneﬁt analyses which tend to model consumer adoption based on
a classical economic model of human behaviour, which assumes
that people weigh gains and losses equally.
Loss-aversion is therefore one plausible explanation as to why
more people were strongly against than strongly in favour of
switching to the tariff in this survey, and, why  so few people switch
tariffs generally, despite the large savings on offer. Prior evidence
from focus groups [84] suggested that loss-aversion was  a key rea-
son for the inertia in the retail electricity market [20] however,
this is the ﬁrst time that loss-aversion has been measured quanti-
tatively, using Kahneman and Tversky’s original decision-question
questions [27] adapted for use amongst a representative sample
of energy bill payers to test whether loss-aversion is statistically
signiﬁcantly related to their willingness to switch energy tariff.
The remaining question now is, what, if anything, can marketers
and tariff designers do to help ensure that loss-aversion does not
stiﬂe consumer switching rates to sTOU tariffs, once they become
widely commercially available, following the smart meter roll out?
5.3. Loss-framed marketing messages are unlikely to boost
willingness to switch to smart time of use tariffs, regardless of
whether they include the environmental and energy security
lossesWhilst loss-framed messages inﬂuence university students’ atti-
tudes towards climate change [66], the study provides strong
evidence that loss-framed messages will have no commercially
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eaningful impact on the average energy bill payer’s decision over
hether to switch to a sTOU tariff. This is likely to be true regardless
f whether people are also told about the negative environmental
onsequences of not participating in DSR (being less able to exploit
enewable generation) as well as the increased risk of black-outs
rom lower energy system security.
Stronger interventions, such as bill protection or direct load
ontrol (in which a supplier offers consumers guaranteed sav-
ngs in return for remote control over some of their electrical
ppliances), are likely to be more effective at overcoming people’s
oss-aversion. Alternatively, energy suppliers could design sTOU
ariffs so that the off-peak reduction in price (the potential ben-
ﬁt/gain), is greater than the peak increment in price (the potential
oss, relative to a ﬂat-rate tariff), as proposed in a recent review
rticle on cost-reﬂecting electricity pricing [85]. Estimates of loss-
version typically suggest that people weigh losses twice as high as
hey do equivalent gains [29,86] suggesting that, for this to work,
he off-peak rate should be at least 50% lower than the peak rate to
ake a time of use tariff at least as appealing as a ﬂat-rate tariff for
 loss-averse consumer. If a tariff with such price differentials is not
ommercially viable, an alternative approach would be to reduce
he perceived actual costs (e.g. loss of time, comfort) by simplifying
he switching process and offering automation technology free of
harge [85]. In addition, since consumer awareness and knowledge
f these new types of tariffs is relatively low [72], marketing will
e crucial to ensuring that customers are informed about new tariff
aunches.
.4. Electric vehicle ownership and existing legacy time of use
ariff customers—a role for tailored marketing campaigns
A promising approach to boost uptake to sTOU tariffs is to tai-
or tariff marketing to easily identiﬁable sub-groups who have
xpressed an interest in sTOU tariffs. This study ﬁnds that exist-
ng legacy time of use tariff customers, electric vehicle owners and
wners of tumble dryers with timers are all more willing to switch
o a sTOU tariff than any other consumer group in Britain. Exist-
ng legacy time of use tariff customers, the majority of whom are
ikely to be Economy 7 customers (a two-tiered time of use tar-
ff introduced in the 1970s), would be particularly easy for energy
ompanies to target because companies have a record of which
ariffs their customers are on.
The ﬁnding that electric vehicle drivers are more willing to
witch to a sTOU tariff is important because it is expected that
lug-in electric vehicle drivers will perform the majority of their
harging at home [87], with most charging for convenience during
he existing peak times [68,69]. Encouraging electric vehicle own-
rs to switch to a sTOU tariff and charge their vehicles overnight
ould substantially reduce the strain on the electricity network
69,88], which is expected to face considerable challenges due to
he electriﬁcation of transport [67].
.5. Vulnerable groups expressed just as much willingness to
witch to a smart time of use tariff as anyone else
This study provides no evidence that the vulnerable consumers
resent in our sample population will be less willing to switch to
 sTOU tariff than anyone else. Stated willingness to switch did
ot vary by gender, income, educational attainment or across bill
ayers who live in social housing as opposed to private renters
r homeowners. Pre-payment meter customers, the majority of
hom are thought to belong to some of the most disadvantaged
roups in Britain, were slightly more willing to switch to the tariff
han credit customers. The study therefore ﬁnds no evidence that
isadvantaged or vulnerable customers are less likely to beneﬁt
rom smart meters as a result of being unwilling and therefore lessSocial Science 23 (2017) 82–96 93
likely to switch to a sTOU tariff. This ﬁnding almost perfectly repli-
cates those published in a similar study in this journal [8], also a
nationally representative online survey, as well as the only other
comprehensive empirical survey of consumers and sTOU tariffs
[15].
Although one study [71], also conducted online, did ﬁnd
evidence that pre-payment customers and those with energy
affordability concerns would be less willing to accept a variety of
different DSR actions such as having one’s shower or TV turned
off after a set period, it did not mention that such actions would
likely be rewarded ﬁnancially (e.g. through a lower unit price for
electricity). Taken together with the results of this study and those
in [34], this suggests that policymakers and DSR providers should
ensure that people are given sufﬁcient information to estimate the
possible ﬁnancial beneﬁts of participating in DSR to ensure that the
potential beneﬁts of participation are equally distributed.
The results also suggest that more consideration should be given
to the possible risks of people choosing to switch to time-based
tariffs that are unsuitable for them, rather than that they might be
excluded from the beneﬁts of DSR through being unwilling to sign
up to them. The key research priority should now be to establish
whether actual switching rates to these tariffs are the same across
all socio-demographic groups. Ideally, this research would also test
whether low-income groups are equally able to adjust their con-
sumption patterns, once on such tariffs, to avoid the expensive peak
time rates. Low-income groups may  be less able to purchase the
types of technologies which make it easier or ﬁnancially advanta-
geous for households to shift their electricity consumption away
from peak times. For example, at present, plug-in electric vehicles
are about twice the price of new petrol cars. Moreover, if low-
income consumers already have very low baseline consumption,
this could constrain their ability to save money on sTOU tariffs com-
pared to those with above average consumption, particularly those
with high ﬂexible peak time consumption.
5.6. Home occupancy patterns and children do not inﬂuence
stated willingness to switch
Consumer organisations [15,89] have sometimes argued that
sTOU tariffs will not be popular amongst people with children
whom they claim need to be able to use the washing machine fre-
quently, regardless of the time of day, as well as people who  are not
in the house during the cheaper off-peak times (e.g. people working
standard business hours). However, stated willingness to switch to
the tariff did not vary by employment status or across people living
in households with and without children under the age of 15. Par-
ticipants who  reported living in a household in which one adult was
regularly at home during off-peak hours did not indicate a greater
stated willingness to switch to the tariff. In fact, the tariff was more
popular amongst participants who  reported living in a household
which was regularly empty during off-peak times and occupied
during peak-times, even after controlling for other demographic
differences and whether or not they owned wet goods with timers.
The discrepancy between opinions expressed about DSR tariffs
by individual focus group participants and the collective opinion of
national survey participants is not unusual or surprising [8]. How-
ever, these results suggest that we  should not make assumptions
about the likely willingness of consumers to switch to time-based
tariffs based on their home occupancy patterns and employment
statuses. In particular, this study suggests that concerns raised
about sTOU tariffs by focus group participants with children or
participants with 9 a.m.–5 p.m. jobs [15] do not generalise to the
average British family with children or the average working person
with standard business working hours.
This study is unable to rule out the possibility that people with
children or who are frequently at home during the expensive, peak
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imes may  ﬁnd it harder to save money on sTOU tariffs. How-
ver, these consumers are not precluded from beneﬁtting from
ime of use pricing if they own or purchase the right enabling
echnologies.9 Indeed, sTOU tariffs aim to change people’s con-
umption patterns; if sTOU tariffs were only adopted by consumers
ho were already consuming energy at off-peak times, there would
e no added beneﬁt to the electricity network in introducing time
f use pricing. Nevertheless, since women perform the overwhelm-
ng share of domestic chores and childrearing responsibilities [90],
ncluding most peak-time energy using activities [91], we may  be
oncerned that the burden of adjusting consumption patterns to
uit these tariffs could fall disproportionately on female house-
older members. Home automation equipment or third party direct
oad control could help to reduce the burden on those undertak-
ng the majority of electricity intensive household tasks, such as
ashing and drying clothes.
. Limitations
There are four main limitations to this study. First, whilst the
esults can be reliably generalised to the 86% of British energy
ill payers with internet access regardless of age, gender, region,
mployment status and social grade, the results may  not gener-
lise to energy bill payers who do not participate in online market
esearch (self-selection bias) or to the ∼14% of energy bill payers
ithout internet access (coverage bias). Selection bias is a common
roblem with any research in which people’s consent to partici-
ate must be explicitly obtained in advance. However, selection
ias is not a major threat to the generalisability of the ﬁndings
ecause it seems unlikely that differences between energy bill pay-
rs who participate in market research and those who  do not would
e so weakly correlated with the key demographic variables from
hich the survey weights were constructed yet so strongly corre-
ated with willingness to switch to a sTOU tariff, so as to render the
election bias sufﬁciently large as to substantively alter the results.
overage bias is potentially a greater limitation. According to data
ollected by the UK Ofﬁce for National Statistics (ONS), the majority
53%) of people who report not having access to the internet say that
his is because they do not need it [92] suggesting that, for the most
art, lack of internet access is not a proxy for vulnerability. How-
ver, an important minority state that their lack of access is due to a
ack of skills (32%) and the high cost of equipment (12%) and access
11%) [92]. Survey weights can only correct for this type of selection
rror to the extent that computer literacy and affordability concerns
re correlated with age, gender, region and social grade (the vari-
bles from which the weights were constructed). Second, this study
easured intention to switch rather than actual switching rates to
 sTOU tariff and evidence suggests that purchase intentions are not
erfect predictors of actual purchasing choices [93]. However, until
TOU tariffs become widely commercially available, studies that are
ased on hypothetical choices (such as this one) can provide a use-
ul indication of the likely level of uptake to sTOU tariffs amongst
nergy bill payers. Third, although it was found that loss-aversion
as negatively correlated with stated willingness to switch, the
tudy was not set up to measure what losses people were most
oncerned about. Future research could attempt to identify the ref-
rence point used to evaluate gains and losses to aid in the design
f interventions to overcome loss-aversion. Finally, although we
odelled the drivers of willingness to switch to a sTOU with nearly
0 individual-level control variables, there may  be other important
eterminants of willingness to switch for which we were unable to
9 The results are robust to regression speciﬁcations which exclude the dummy
ariable controlling for ownership of wet goods with timers (results for this speci-
cation not reported here). Social Science 23 (2017) 82–96
control, which means the coefﬁcients are correlational and must
not be interpreted causally.
7. Conclusion
A major challenge for realising the business case for smart
meters and for maintaining future energy security is to encour-
age consumers to switch from ﬂat-rate electricity tariffs to one of a
new generation of smart meter enabled time of use electricity tar-
iffs (sTOU) [3]. This is one of the ﬁrst studies to measure national
demand for a next generation sTOU tariff and the very ﬁrst study
to test whether insights from behavioural economics, which have
been most successfully applied in the health and personal ﬁnance
domains, could also be used to boost uptake to sTOU tariffs amongst
a nationally representative sample of energy bill payers. It is also
the ﬁrst study to measure loss-aversion amongst a nationally rep-
resentative sample of energy bill payers and directly link it to their
willingness to switch to an energy tariff, in this case a sTOU tariff.
To achieve this, the authors designed and ran a representative
survey experiment on a nationally representative sample of over
2000 British energy bill payers. Consistent with a previous national
survey [8], the data suggests that over a third of energy bill pay-
ers are in favour of switching to a sTOU tariff, indicating a sizeable
potential market for these tariffs. However, there is substantial vari-
ation in willingness to switch, with more people being strongly
against than strongly in favour of switching. The results suggest
that these differences are driven by differences in loss-aversion
and ownership of demand-ﬂexible appliances rather than standard
socio-economic/demographic factors. The results found that over
90% of energy bill payers are loss-averse (care more about avoiding
ﬁnancial losses than making ﬁnancial savings) and also that peo-
ple who evaluate costs and beneﬁts in this way were statistically
signiﬁcantly less willing to switch to the sTOU tariff. This makes
sense because, although people could save money by switching to
a sTOU tariff and using less electricity at peak times, they could
also stand to increase their bills if they are unable to shift their con-
sumption away from peaks. They would also lose ﬂexibility over the
timing of their electricity use. Further research is now required to
test whether a third of bill payers would switch, if given the choice
in reality, and how to overcome loss-aversion to ensure domestic
consumers do participate in DSR.
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